On Certainty :: Essays Papers

On CertaintyIn his essay An Argument for question, Peter Unger makes the case for the universal form of the skeptical thesis. He is arguing for the position that both type of cognition is impossible for any person. His argument seems to be a simple one, derived from two very discharge hypotheses, but that is non the case. This paper is an attempt to show that while philosophically interesting, Ungers attack on knowledge is not nearly so damaging as he contends. I willing argue that Unger mischaracterizes the nature of receivedty as it is ordinarily used (something he says is important to his argument), and too that he has mischaracterized one of the sources he used to defend this definition. I will then present W.V.O. Quines psychologically based epistemology as presented in Epistemology Naturalized and Two Dogmas of Empiricism, and argue that this theory provides a more than adequate account of the way knowledge and certainty are understood. I will also attempt to add ress the objections to Quines theory embossed by Jaegwon Kim.So, how does one begin an attack on all knowledge? The answer, as it turns out, is quite simply. Ungers argument consists of only two acquaints. The for the first time of these states that If someone knows something to be so, then it is all mature for the person to be absolutely certain that it is so (238). To this is added the second inclose, that It is n incessantly all right for anyone to be absolutely certain that anything is so (238). Clearly, the conclusion Nobody ever knows that anything is so(238) follows. Unger next alters these premises slightly, adding the idea of overriding consideratenesss. The first premise is the same except with the words providing only that no overriding consideration (or considerations) make it not all right (241). Likewise, the second premise becomes It is not the case that it is all right for someone to be absolutely certain that something is so providing only that no overr iding (consideration or) considerations make it all right. (242).I am perfectly willing to grant Unger the first premise. I envisage that there is no problem with allowing him this, in and of itself. Even the second premise is allowable in a certain, philosophically interesting sense, and in this sense, Ungers argument is very strong. The philosophical ideal of absolute certainty is something that I think should be given up as a swollen pursuit, and I think that Unger shows this nicely.